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Because legal insurance policies cover the expenses of plaintiffs in
bringing legal claims, such policies increase the risk of negligent or careless
acts by tortfeasors. For this reason, potential tortfeasors would prefer to avoid
injuring holders of legal insurance policies. Since insurance coverage (or
lack thereof) is not observable to a tortfeasor prior to an accident, tortfeasors
can never exercise this preference ex ante. As a result, insured tort victims
provide deterrence benefits to those that are uninsured by increasing the over-
all expected costs of engaging in negligent, harmful behavior. In magnifying
a tort offender’s overall risk of facing legal action, this multiplication effect
of insurance policies enhances deterrence, inducing increased overall safety
levels.
Unfortunately, however, the multiplication effect of legal insurance
reduces the demand for legal expense insurance policies. Because policyhold-
ers do not capture the full benefits of legal insurance policies on safety, too
few individuals sign up for such policies. As a result of this public good
effect, the average price of insurance policies remains high, which reduces the
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demand for legal expense insurance policies. In revealing these overlooked
collective action issues, this Article opens new inroads for policy discussions
regarding legal insurance markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Whenever litigation costs discourage a plaintiff from pur-
suing a rightful legal claim, the deterrent effect of the legal
system is undermined.1
The burden of litigation is reduced if a potential litigant
can take out insurance policies against prospective litigation.2
Insurance policies commonly cover the costs of defending
against a lawsuit (passive insurance policies), but insurance
1. Plaintiffs do not usually take into account the positive effect of their
lawsuits on the deterrent function of the tort system. This problem will be
especially acute if the social benefits of a lawsuit outweigh the private gains
to the plaintiff. See Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring
Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982). A recent study
estimates that tort victims pursue legal recourse in barely one out of ten
accidents. See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJU-
RIES IN THE UNITED STATES 175 (2005). Note, however, that proposals to stim-
ulate legal claims must also take into account the additional costs of litiga-
tion that might result. Shavell, supra, at 336 (explaining the potential mis-
alignment between private and social incentives to bring lawsuits).
2. See infra Part I.
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companies may also offer policies that cover the expenses of
plaintiffs to bring forth and litigate a claim in court (active in-
surance policies). By improving access to the justice system,
legal expense insurance increases the overall deterrent effect
of the tort system.3 If active legal insurance policy subscrip-
tions are widespread, victims are more likely to be able to af-
ford the legal expenses to pursue a valid claim in court and
hold tortfeasors accountable.4 Consequently, by increasing the
expected costs of negligent behavior, legal expense insurance
induces careful behavior and potentially reduces the overall
amount of accidents in society.5
3. See Michael Trebilcock, Innovations in Service Delivery, ONTARIO MINIS-
TRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/about/pubs/trebilcock/section7.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2011)
(“[L]egal insurance may be one means to significantly improve access to
justice . . . .”); see also Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, The Role of Legal Expenses
Insurance in Securing Access to the Legal Services Market, in REFORM OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON ‘ACCESS TO JUSTICE’, 305, 310 (A.A.S. Zuckerman &
Ross Cranston eds., 1995).
4. Trebilcock, supra note 3; see also Gray & Rickman, supra note 3.
5. An expanding body of empirical research substantiates the deterrent
effect of tort law. First, studies have revealed the relation between product
liability and safety improvements. See, e.g., DON DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING
THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1996) (re-
porting studies showing that over one in three companies had improved the
safety of their products and almost half had improved product usage and
warranties as a result of product liability law). Second, when states elimi-
nated liability insurance in favor of no-fault systems, several studies report
that this switch caused a statistically significant increase in auto accidents or
fatalities. See, e.g., J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault
Automobile Insurance, 44 J.L. & ECON. 427, 454–55 (2001) (linking no-fault
systems and higher fatality rates in various states in the United States if negli-
gence assignment under tort is sufficiently responsive to the driver’s level of
care); Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49,
49–50 (1982) (reporting increased accident losses in no-fault states in vari-
ous U.S. states); R. Ian McEwin, No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australasian
Evidence, 9 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 13, 14 (1989) (finding similar effects in
New Zealand). Deterrent effects have also been observed in the trend to-
wards more stringent regulation of alcohol use and driving. See, e.g., Frank J.
Chaloupka et al., Alcohol-Control Policies and Motor-Vehicle Fatalities, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 161, 184 (1993); Lan Liang et al., Precaution, Compensation, and Threats
of Sanction: The Case of Alcohol Servers, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 49, 67–68
(2004). For a summary of the research on the deterrent effects of tort law,
see Ben C.J. Van Velthoven, Empirics of Tort, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS, TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 453 (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed.
2009).
4 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:1
Despite these benefits, active legal insurance policies are
surprisingly uncommon. By most accounts, only a very small
fraction of U.S. households purchase legal expense insurance
policies that cover the costs of bringing lawsuits.6 Similarly,
while legal expense insurance markets are growing in Europe,
active legal insurance policies represent only one percent of
total premiums there.
The scarcity of active legal expense insurance coverage is
puzzling. The availability of alternative instruments that in-
crease access to justice, such as contingency fee arrangements
and public legal aid arrangements cannot explain the dearth
of coverage observed today. While contingency fee arrange-
ments may reduce the need for legal expense insurance, legal
insurance policies are also uncommon in countries where con-
tingency fees are prohibited.7 Similarly, legal expense insur-
ance policies are not widely subscribed even in countries that
do not provide public legal aid programs.8
This Article explains the low demand for legal expense
insurance coverage by identifying an important and currently
6. Most insurance policies in the United States involve prepaid plans for
predictable and specified events that are low-cost but occur with high fre-
quency (e.g., simple divorces, wills, and estates). These prepaid plans rarely
offer assistance for complex legal problems (although some offer discounts
on private lawyer services for more complex matters). See Francis Regan,
Whatever Happened To Legal Expense Insurance?, 26 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 293, 295
(2001); see also GEOFFREY MCGOVERN ET AL., THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUND-
ING AND CLAIM TRANSFER (2010) (ebook) (“‘Before-the-event’ and ‘after-the-
event’ legal insurance policies are not common in the United States. . . .”);
Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of
Litigation Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673, 674 (2012) (“Litigation ex-
pense insurance is not yet an American phenomenon. . . .”); Matthias Kilian,
Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broadening
Access to Justice: The German Experience, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 31, 36 (2003) (report-
ing U.S. data on legal insurance coverage).
7. In many civil law countries contingency fees are prohibited. In
Belgium, for instance, contingency fee agreements are prohibited even
though merely 15% of the population is covered by public legal aid. Histori-
cally, the number of individuals with legal insurance in Belgium has been
extremely low. In 2007, the Minister of Justice and the insurance companies
agreed to set up a general legal expenses insurance system. For an annual
subscription of _144 the system entitles an individual to costless legal aid by a
lawyer. Only 6.7% of the population has enrolled for the program. Note that
the scope of the legal matters covered by this insurance is rather limited. See
Int’l Legal Aid Grp. Conf., National Report: Belgium (2009).
8. Gray & Rickman, supra note 3, at 315.
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overlooked beneficial public good attribute of legal expense
insurance. Due to the nature of accidents and the unobserv-
able nature of insurance coverage ex ante, tort offenders are
typically not able to distinguish or select between potential vic-
tims who have taken out a legal insurance policy and those
who have not. While a potential tort offender might want to
avoid getting involved in an accident with holders of legal ex-
pense insurance policies (i.e., those who can afford to pursue
legal action more easily), tortfeasors are not able exercise this
preference ex ante since an individual’s insurance coverage
(or lack thereof) is not observable to a tort offender prior to
an accident. As a result, every additional policyholder in-
creases the average likelihood that a negligent offender will be
held accountable for his or her tortious actions. In other
words, even if not every potential victim is insured to bring
legal claims, those that are insured provide deterrence bene-
fits to everyone else by increasing the overall expected costs of
engaging in negligent, harmful behavior. By increasing
tortfeasors’ overall risk of facing legal action this multiplica-
tion effect of insurance policies significantly enhances deter-
rence and the bite of the tort system in general.9 The capacity
of legal insurance policies to spread out the deterrence effects
across society—even if not everyone is covered by insurance—
is socially valuable.
Paradoxically, however, the multiplication effect of legal
insurance policies reduces the demand for legal insurance poli-
cies. Because the ex ante deterrent effect of any individual in-
surance policy is shared with all other potential accident vic-
tims—regardless of whether they are insured or not—individ-
ual policyholders do not capture the full benefits of their
policies on deterrence; instead they subsidize the deterrence
benefits of other members of the public who are uninsured.
9. The concept of a multiplication effect was introduced in a paper dis-
cussing the relative benefits of carrots versus sticks as legal incentives. See
Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline
of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (2013). Although a punishment can be ap-
plied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. This is
possible because, when parties comply, the punishment is not applied and
can thus be used to support a new threat. Id. at 361–62. On the choice be-
tween subsidies and taxes in making policy, see also Brian Galle, The Tragedy
of the Carrots: Economics & Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 797 (2012).
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Because individuals fail to consider the external deterrence
benefits of legal insurance,  less than the optimal number of
individuals take out insurance policies. As a result of this pub-
lic good aspect of legal expense insurance, the average price
of such policies remains high, which further reduces demand.
The situation resembles a collective action problem: since eve-
ryone necessarily shares in the beneficial deterrent effect of
insurance, not enough individuals voluntarily take out such
policies, and much of the potential social value of legal insur-
ance (the potential deterrence benefits on the tort system) re-
mains unexploited.10
Additionally, legal insurance markets are plagued by a sec-
ond collective action problem. Specifically, because all insur-
ance companies share the overall benefits (deterrence and re-
duced accident costs) that result if one or more companies
offer legal expense insurance, legal insurance markets face a
public good issue on the supply side as well. As a result of the
modest demand by consumers and the positive externalities
for competitors that do not offer legal insurance, most insur-
ance companies do not actively promote legal expense insur-
ance policies.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a concise
background to legal insurance markets. Part II describes the
conventional challenges to insurance markets. Part III first de-
scribes the beneficial multiplication effect of legal expense in-
surance before analyzing the hereto-overlooked collective ac-
tion issue of legal insurance markets and its effect on the de-
mand for legal insurance. We also describe similarities to
historical prosecution societies and more recent instruments
such as Lojack devices. Part IV discusses supply side issues in
legal insurance markets. Part V formulates policy recommen-
dations, including mandatory subrogation, providing insur-
ance incentives, and compulsory insurance.
10. For classic descriptions on the public good problem, see, for exam-
ple, Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387 (1954), and Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods,
13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970).
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I.
LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE IN CONTEXT
Most individuals are risk-averse.11 When presented with a
choice between a certain loss of $10 over a 10% chance of los-
ing $100, individuals prefer the former option even though
the expected value of these losses is the same.12 For this rea-
son, insurance policies are an attractive option for risk-averse
individuals.13 By making premium payments on a periodic ba-
sis, “insurance allows people to shift money from times when
they do not need it very much to times when they need it
much more.”14 In the area of torts, for instance, first-party
damage insurance provides potential accident victims reassur-
ance that they will recoup some of the costs incurred in case of
an accident.
Tort accidents often raise important legal questions or
factual matters relating to the level of precaution taken, safety
measures and other issues that determine liability. Because le-
gal procedures on tort liability are costly, most standard insur-
ance policies include coverage for legal assistance. Legal ex-
pense insurance, also known as legal cost insurance, legal pro-
tection insurance, or simply legal insurance, is a voluntary
private insurance instrument that covers the costs of lawsuits.15
Although the expenses involved with defending policyholders
against tort suits are included in most personal, professional,
and commercial liability insurance policies (passive legal insur-
ance), the costs of bringing legal suits (active insurance) is
rarely included in insurance policies. Although generally avail-
11. Because individuals are risk-averse, money has a declining marginal
utility. As a result, “insurance is a more efficient way than savings to equalize
the marginal utility of consumption over time.” Tom Baker & Peter Siegel-
man, Law and Economics After the Behavioral Turn: Learning from Insurance 6
(Petrie-Flom Center, Working Paper, 2011).
12. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
(1987).
13. In a world with perfect information and no transaction costs, every-
one would be better off insuring against all risks. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Insur-
ance, Risk and Resource Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING
134 (1971) (discussing the problems created by adverse selection and moral
hazard).
14. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 11, at 6.
15. First and foremost, coverage typically includes legal fees charged (in-
cluding expenses incurred) by a lawyer or law firm representing the policy-
holder.
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able in developed insurance markets,16 individuals in the
United States rarely take out legal insurance policies that cover
the cost of bringing litigation.17 Similarly, in most industrial-
ized nations a relatively small fraction of households take out
legal insurance policies. Although legal insurance markets are
growing in Europe,18 legal insurance coverage represents only
one percent of total premiums.19 Similarly, legal insurance
coverage has not flourished in most countries, including
France,20 the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.21
The lack of success of legal insurance policies is intrigu-
ing. Legal expense insurance provides considerable benefits to
policyholders. First, legal insurance shares in common with
other insurance instruments the benefit of reducing one’s ex-
posure to risk. Since litigation is a small chance event with po-
16. Vivien Prais, Legal Expenses Insurance, in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
supra note 3, at 431.
17. See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.
18. In some countries, including Hungary, Luxemburg, Portugal, and
Turkey, legal insurance coverage has in fact declined between 2000 and
2008. See CENTRE D’ETUDES D’ASSURANCE, EUROPEAN INSURANCE IN FIGURES
(2009), http://www.argusdelassurance.com/mediatheque/5/1/6/
000014615.pdf.
19. Id.; see also Michael Faure & Jef De Mot, Comparing Third-Party Financ-
ing of Litigation and Legal Expenses Insurance, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 743, 751
(2012) (comparing legal insurance to third-party financing and concluding
that legal insurance is not as widespread in Europe as is sometimes alleged).
One apparent exception is Sweden. While 97% of Swedes are covered by
legal expense insurance, this high coverage is due to the fact that legal ex-
pense insurance is automatically added onto other insurance policies with a
high market penetration (such as housing insurance). Furthermore, as a
compulsory add-on insurance, such legal expense insurance policies typically
restrict legal assistance to a relatively narrow range of legal claims. See C.M.C.
VAN ZEELAND & J.M. BARENDRECHT, LEGAL AID SYSTEMS COMPARED (2003);
Matthias Killian & Francis Regan, Legal Expenses Insurance and Legal Aid—Two
Sides of the Same Coin? The Experience from Germany and Sweden, 11 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 233, 250 (2004); Francis Regan, The Swedish Legal Services Policy
Remix: The Shift from Public Legal Aid to Private Legal Expense Insurance, 30 J.L.
& SOC’Y 49 (2003).
20. For details see BERNARD CERVEAU, L’ASSURANCE DE PROTECTION
JURIDIQUE: MARCHE´, GARANTIES, PERSPECTIVES (L’Argus de l’Assurance ed.,
2006).
21. Regan, The Swedish Legal Services Policy Remix, supra note 19, at 50–51.
A study by the Ministry of Justice on the market for “before the event” insur-
ance confirms this trend in the United Kingdom as well. OONA MCDONALD,
IAN WINTERS & MIKE HARMER, THE MARKET FOR ‘BTE’ LEGAL EXPENSES INSUR-
ANCE, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 51–56 (2007).
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tentially substantial costs, risk-averse individuals stand to bene-
fit from legal insurance coverage.22 Second, legal insurance
policies enhance a plaintiff’s bargaining position.23 Because
the defendant is aware that an insurance provider will reim-
burse the plaintiff’s litigation costs, the threat of litigation be-
comes more salient to a tortfeasor. As a result, insured defend-
ants are more likely to receive fair settlement offers.
To illustrate the benefit that an active legal insurance pol-
icy confers to a subscriber, consider the following numerical
example. If there is a 50% probability of obtaining $1000 in
court and the legal costs are $300, the expected value of the
plaintiff’s legal claim is $200 (50% x 1000 – 300). The defen-
dant’s expected costs of the claim are $800 (50% x 1000 +
300). The claim will be settled if the parties can agree on a
number that is within the bargaining range of the plaintiff’s
minimum settlement amount ($200) and the defendants max-
imum offer ($800). In an equal division of the surplus, the
defendant and plaintiff would settle the claim at $500.24 If,
however, the plaintiff’s claim is covered by a legal insurance
policy, the plaintiff is in a stronger bargaining position given
that the litigation costs are a concern to the defendant (50% x
1000 + 300 = 800) but not to the plaintiff (50% x 1000 = 500).
In other words, if litigation costs are covered by legal expense
insurance, a rational plaintiff will not settle at an amount be-
low $500. In that case, an equal division of the surplus between
the parties is a settlement amount of $650.
Moreover, society also benefits if legal insurance is wide-
spread. Whenever, in the absence of legal insurance, a plaintiff
lacks the resources to pursue a valid legal claim in court, the
deterrent effect of the tort system is reduced.25 Empirical re-
22. Empirical research suggests that individuals are risk-averse when fac-
ing losses with modest probabilities. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979).
23. Roland Kirstein, Risk Neutrality and Strategic Insurance, 25 GENEVA PA-
PERS ON RISK & INSURANCE 251, 252 (2000).
24. Behavioral research suggests that equal divisions can be a focal point
in negotiations since they align with pre-existing notions of fairness among
the parties. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness in Game Theory and
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993).
25. Legal insurance can be socially costly, however, if it induces frivolous
lawsuits, especially if costly litigation forces defendants into accepting settle-
ments for claims with little or no merit. This risk can be reduced by procedu-
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search suggests that this is an acute problem in various areas of
tort law. Empirical research shows that a very small percentage
of injured Americans pursue legal recourse against
tortfeasors.26 In the area of medical malpractice, for instance,
research shows that, contrary to public perception,27 many le-
gitimate cases are not pursued.28 Moreover, victims are not al-
ways fully compensated by courts.29 This has a potentially dev-
ral safeguards against frivolous litigation and the fact that defendants often
carry litigation insurance. Finally the intervention by insurance companies
mitigates this risk considerably. See infra Section IV.A.
26. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 175 (observing that only about
10% of those who suffer from accidents file suit).
27. It is common to hear claims that the United States suffers from exces-
sive tort litigation. See, e.g., PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1996) (claiming that the law is
suffocating the country). Contrary to this popular wisdom, many reputed
scholars have noted that the so-called litigation explosion in the United
States in the last four decades is a myth. See, e.g., John T. Nockleby, How to
Manufacture a Crisis: Evaluating Empirical Claims Behind “Tort Reform”, 86 OR.
L. REV. 533, 537–41, 550–51 (providing evidence that increased tort filings
were caused by population growth and examples of stories about tort law
that turned out to be false); see also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN,
DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004)
(offering evidence that the media and interest groups have greatly over-
stated unrepresentative stories about tort law); Richard A. Posner, Demand
and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts over the Last Half Century, 8 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 133 (2006) (empirical study reporting a drop off of tort
litigation and damage awards since the 1980s). A recent study found no asso-
ciation between tort law and economic harm. On the contrary, a strong rela-
tionship between pro-plaintiff tort law and economic growth was observed.
Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28
(2011) (examining the effects of tort law using indices created by two pro-
defendant organizations: the United States Chamber of Commerce and the
Pacific Research Institute).
28. See Lori B. Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for Mal-
practice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 370 (2005) (reporting that
about 1.2% of patients who suffered a medical error filed suit); David M.
Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 250 (2000) (reporting that 97% of those pa-
tients who suffered a negligent injury did not sue). For an overview of these
and similar studies, see David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice
Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085,
1089–91 (2006).
29. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW 140 (2001) (finding that most malpractice actions containing
strong legal claims result in compensation that does not even cover the vic-
tim’s economic losses); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for
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astating impact on public safety.30 In chemical industries for
instance, researchers have linked chemical pollution safety is-
sues to a lack of litigation and accountability.31 Although tort
liability has reduced chemical hazards to some degree, acute
chemical injuries and chronic diseases due to chemical expo-
sure remain largely unaccounted.32
To illustrate the deterrent effect of legal insurance, con-
sider a second numerical example. A plaintiff has a negative
expected value claim if, for instance, there is a 50% probability
of obtaining $500 in court and the legal costs are $300. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff’s claim is covered by legal insurance, the re-
duction of the plaintiff’s litigation costs turns a negative value
claim (50% x 500 – 300 = -50) into a positive value claim (50%
x 500 = +250). If legal insurance is widespread, potential tort
offenders will realize that it is more likely that they will be held
accountable for their actions,33 which might increase careful
behavior and reduce the overall amount of accidents in soci-
ety.34 Overall, by increasing accountability for negligent behav-
ior, legal expense insurance benefits individual policy sub-
scribers as well as the general public.35
Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to
Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 95–97 (1989) (reporting judgments
and settlements in product liability litigation which do not cover the actual
harm suffered by the victim).
30. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 443, 447, 460 (1987); see also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV., 1147, 1183–89 (1992).
31. See Nicholas A. Ashford & Robert F. Stone, Liability, Innovation, and
Safety in the Chemical Industry, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY
LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 367 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991) (developing an optimal deterrence benchmark, reflecting on the total
social costs of chemical harm, and evaluating the liability costs to the chemi-
cal industry in relation to this benchmark).
32. Id. at 368.
33. Id. at 377.
34. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 12 (analyzing the various incentive
effects of the tort system on behavior).
35. One reservation is that when accidents are bilateral (victims also in-
fluence the accident rate), insurance might create careless behavior. This
effect, also known as moral hazard, applies most strongly to general damage
insurance. Moreover, insurance companies and tort rules can help reduce
moral hazards by increasing the accountability of victims (for instance when
courts apply comparative negligence or when insurance companies include
deductibles). Id. at 26–31.
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II.
CHALLENGES TO LEGAL INSURANCE MARKETS: DEMAND SIDE
Despite the clear advantages, legal expense insurance pol-
icies are not widespread.36 Several explanations have been of-
fered to understand the curious scarcity of legal expense insur-
ance. First, contingency fees may reduce the need for legal ex-
pense insurance.37 Indeed, contingency fees are functionally
similar to insurance policies in that they remove litigation
costs from consideration for the individual plaintiff: the plain-
tiff lawyer carries the burden of litigation costs under a contin-
gency fee arrangement and the insurance company finances
the litigation. There are some differences however; a plaintiff
will need to retain a lawyer who is willing to take the case on a
contingency fee basis. While insurance companies are well
suited to spread out litigation costs across a large group of pol-
icyholders ex ante (so called “before the accident events”),
lawyers will be reluctant to take on ex post disputes (“after the
accident events”) that  involve relatively high litigation costs,
especially since the contingency fee arrangement provides the
lawyer only a fraction of the potential damage award.38 In
other words, contingency fees are not a perfect substitute for
legal insurance. Additionally, legal expense insurance is infre-
quent in countries where only a modest fraction of the popula-
tion is eligible for legal aid and where contingency fees are
prohibited.39
Second, the low demand for legal insurance is sometimes
attributed to the fact that individuals tend to underestimate
both the probability that they will be involved in a legal case40
and the expenses involved in litigation,41 or incorrectly assume
36. See supra Part I.
37. See supra Part I.
38. Accordingly, contingency fees do not turn negative value suits into
positive value lawsuits. By contrast, since legal expense insurance removes
litigation costs from an individual policyholder’s consideration, the plaintiff
will have a more credible claim. Of course, the insurance company will need
to sign off on the litigation, but insurance companies might be able to
spread the costs of litigation across a larger pool of disputes than any individ-
ual lawyer or law firm working on a contingency fee. Note that, even if insur-
ance companies regularly settle tort disputes, the deterrent effect of the poli-
cies is sustained for the most part.
39. Int’l Legal Aid Grp. Conf., supra note 7.
40. Regan, supra note 6, at 295.
41. Gray & Rickman, supra note 3, at 310.
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that they are covered by legal aid policies.42 If individuals un-
derestimate the potential costs of adverse events, this reduces
their willingness to incur the expense of monthly premiums
that cover legal insurance.43 On the other hand, behavioral
research suggests that individuals are very sensitive to salient
risks involving high potential costs.44 This certainly applies to
litigation since, when reporting on legal issues, mainstream
media outlets tend to focus disproportionally on the most sali-
ent legal stories that involve outliers encompassing, for in-
stance, exorbitant legal fees, massive jury awards, and excessive
litigation costs.45 As a result, it is unlikely the low demand for
legal insurance can be attributed solely to behavioral disposi-
tions, such as underestimation of tort risk and litigation costs.
To summarize, although the conventional explanations
regarding the scarcity of legal insurance have some merit, they
cannot fully explain, nor justify, the uncommonness of legal
expense insurance. As we explain below, the scarcity of legal
expense insurance cannot be fully understood without recog-
nizing the multiplication effect of legal insurance.
III.
THE MULTIPLICATION EFFECT OF LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE
A. Basic Effect
In many potential accident situations, individuals make
decisions that affect the relative likelihood and magnitude of
harm inflicted on potential victims. For instance when decid-
ing to engage in a relatively dangerous activity (e.g., street car
racing) in one neighborhood over another, harm is more
likely to be inflicted on residents in the designated neighbor-
hood as opposed to the non-selected neighborhoods. But even
in situations where individuals control how and where they
conduct dangerous activities, potential tort offenders are not
42. Id. at 315.
43. For a review of “demand side anomalies” in the insurance market, see
HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MARK PAULY & STACY MCMORROW, INSURANCE AND BE-
HAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD
INDUSTRY (2013).
44. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Zeckhauser, Overreaction to Fearsome Risks,
48 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 435 (2011).
45. Saks, supra note 30, at 1161 (documenting how news media outlets
focus on outliers in legal news reports).
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able to distinguish between potential victims who have taken
out a legal insurance policy and those who have not. Insurance
coverage is unobservable before any given accident. Although
a potential tort offender might want to avoid injuring insur-
ance policyholders (who can afford to pursue legal action
more easily), they can never exercise this preference ex ante.
Since tort offenders are unable to distinguish ex ante be-
tween potential plaintiffs who have taken out a legal insurance
policy and those who have not, every additional holder of legal
expense insurance increases the probability that a negligent
offender will be held accountable. Even if not every potential
victim is insured to bring legal claims, those that are insured
provide benefits to others since every additional policy in-
creases the overall expected costs of engaging in negligent,
harmful behavior. This multiplication effect of insurance poli-
cies significantly enhances deterrence and the bite of the tort
system.
The following stylized example illustrates the multiplica-
tion effect and its consequences. Assume a world in which
there is just one potential injurer and ten potential victims.
The injurer must decide how much care he or she will exercise
(investment in precautions, etc.) when engaging in an activity.
If the injurer takes no care, each victim suffers a loss of $100
with certainty. If the injurer takes care (at a cost of $10 to the
potential injurer), victims will not incur any harm. Assume fur-
ther that the victim would need to spend $150 to successfully
pursue the legal claim. The courts apply a rule of strict liabil-
ity.46 Only two out of ten potential victims purchase legal in-
surance coverage. Imagine first a scenario where the injurer
knows who is insured and who is not. If so, the injurer will take
care (spend $10) in order to prevent an accident involving the
two individuals that are insured (because the cost of care is
smaller than the damages), but will forsake these investments
with regard to the uninsured victims (who will not file suit be-
cause their claim has negative expected value). As a result, the
two insured victims will not suffer any harm, while the other
eight victims will each suffer $100 in harm. In a second, more
realistic scenario the injurer cannot distinguish before the ac-
cident between insured and uninsured victims. Consequently,
46. This example also illustrates that the multiplication effect occurs if a
rule of negligence applies.
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for each potential victim that is harmed, the injurer faces a
20% chance that a legal claim will be pursued. This encour-
ages the injurer to invest in precautions at all times, as it per-
tains to all ten potential victims (both insured and uninsured).
Investing in precautions costs only $10. By contrast, the ex-
pected costs of engaging in the activity without taking any pre-
cautions is $20 since there is a 20% probability that any given
victim will pursue legal action in which case the court will
award $100. This example illustrates how the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing across insured and uninsured defendants has a
magnifying effect of every individual legal insurance policy.
Next we address a demand side complication that undermines
the full potential of the beneficial multiplication effect de-
scribed in this part.
B. Multiplication as a Collective Action Problem
Despite the positive effect on deterrence, the multiplica-
tion effect of legal insurance reduces the demand for legal ex-
pense insurance coverage. Because the ex ante deterrent ef-
fect of any individual insurance policy is shared with all other
potential accident victims—regardless of being insured—indi-
vidual policyholders do not capture the full benefits of their
policies on deterrence; instead they subsidize the deterrence
benefits of other members of the public that are uninsured.
Because individuals fail to consider the external deterrence
benefits of legal insurance, fewer individuals take out insur-
ance policies. As a result of this public good problem, the aver-
age price of such policies is high,47 which further reduces de-
mand. The situation resembles a collective action problem:
since everyone necessarily shares in the beneficial deterrent ef-
fect of insurance, not enough individuals voluntarily take out
such policies and much of the social value (the potential deter-
rence benefits of insurance on the tort system) remains unex-
ploited.48
47. Low insurance premiums require that the risk be pooled across a
large group of individual policyholders. In California, for instance, earth-
quake insurance premiums are relatively high because only 17% of home-
owners have taken out such policies. In order to lower premiums, insurance
companies would need to be able to spread the risk across a greater number
of policyholders. See Liz Pulliam Weston, Rethinking Your Stance on Earthquake
Coverage, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2013.
48. See supra sources cited note 30 and accompanying text.
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A numerical example may illustrate this collective action
issue among potential policyholders. Suppose that all potential
victims of a given accident have purchased first party damage
insurance that covers all harm. Every policyholder pays a pre-
mium of $500. Additionally, insurance companies offer legal
expense insurance. Victims must decide whether they will take
out the additional policy.49 If 50% of the potential victims
purchase legal insurance coverage, more legal claims will be
pursued—by removing legal costs, legal insurance turns nega-
tive expected value lawsuits into credible, positive value
claims.50 This, in turn, will induce more careful behavior
among potential tort offenders and likely reduce accident fre-
quency. Since insurance premiums reflect the overall expected
harm, the reduction of accidents will lower damage insurance
premiums overall. Assume that damage insurance premiums
decrease to $450. The premium for the legal insurance is $75.
Policyholders who opt for both damage insurance and legal
insurance will pay a total premium of $525. But the benefits of
the increased deterrence (and lower premium for first party
damage insurance) result regardless of whether any individual
policyholder buys legal insurance—as long as 50% of individu-
als subscribe. So every policyholder is likely to subscribe only
for the damage insurance since (1) he or she might hope that
enough other individual will take out a legal insurance policy;
(2) even if not enough individuals subscribe to legal insur-
ance, the damage insurance premium without higher deter-
rence ($500) is still below the cost of a policy for damage and
legal insurance combined ($525). As a result, policyholders
enlist only for the damage insurance policy and the deterrent
potential of legal insurance remains underexploited.51 This
outcome is disadvantageous to society and to the collective in-
terests of the policyholders in the example. If merely 50% of
the potential victims had subscribed to legal insurance, social
welfare would have increased: for every victim that spends $75
on legal insurance, two potential victims enjoy a reduction of
49. If a third party causes the accident, the victim can sue for damages. If
he loses the case, the damage insurance kicks in. In most instances, of
course, the victim receives compensation from his insurer while the court
case is ongoing.
50. See supra Part I.
51. The fact that accident damage insurance is not always complete (due
to deductibles, etc.) may provide an incentive to purchase legal insurance.
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their expected accident losses of $50 (75 < 2 x 50). However,
potential victims do not take these positive externalities into
account, leading to a socially suboptimal level of legal insur-
ance in society.
C. Analogies
An analogy can be made between legal expense insurance
and “prosecution societies” in eighteenth-century England.52
Historically, the English legal system had a criminal system in
place that lacked a police force or public prosecutors. In the-
ory, any Englishmen could prosecute any crime, but in prac-
tice the victim needed to take upon herself the duties of a pri-
vate prosecutor. But why would a victim ever prosecute? If a
tort victim sues and wins, he or she collects damages. But a
private plaintiff in a criminal suit does not typically obtain any
financial compensation. Although there were some potential
benefits to seeing justice served by way of private prosecution
(e.g., vindication, incapacitation of the defendant when a
prison term is imposed, etc.), a damage award was generally
not available to offset the financial costs of prosecution by the
victim.53 In order to address this issue, societies for the prose-
cution of felons were formed in the eighteenth century. These
societies typically operated within a single town. Each member
contributed a small sum once a year.54 The money was devoted
to prosecuting anyone who committed a felony against any
member of the society. Interestingly, these societies were able
to avoid the free rider problem by publishing the list of mem-
bers in the local newspaper. This avoided (or at least miti-
gated) the free rider problem for two reasons. First, because
local felons could find out whether someone was a member of
a prosecution society in any given town, only paying members
obtained the benefits of being a part of the prosecution soci-
52. See, e.g., Craig B. Little & Christopher P. Sheffield, Frontiers and Crimi-
nal Justice: English Private Prosecution Societies and American Vigilantism in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 796, 797–98 (1983).
53. One reason to prosecute is the possibility of settling out of court (es-
pecially if the defendant has a lot to lose from a conviction). Agreements
between the victim and the defendant were, however, illegal in felony prose-
cutions. Another reason to prosecute was that people who expected to be
victims of multiple offenses could establish a reputation for prosecuting and
thus buy deterrence. Id.
54. See id.
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ety. In other words, members were able to overcome the pub-
lic good problem by internalizing the deterrent benefits (i.e.,
positive externalities) of prosecution societies. Second, by ad-
vertising that they were subscribing to an association that fur-
thered the public good, members shamed non-members into
joining.55
The collective action analogy of legal insurance is also
closely related to a key insight from the literature on crime
prevention56—the distinction between observable and unob-
servable private precautions.57 Observable precautions, such as
putting iron bars on the windows of a house, generate diver-
sion effects (e.g., a thief who notices iron bars across windows
may decide to approach another house). If precautions are
unobservable, some potential victims may be tempted to free
ride on the precautionary investments made by others. A well-
known example involves the installation of Lojack security sys-
tems in cars. A Lojack system is a small radio transmitter that is
55. Joel Mokyr observes:
The enforcement of property rights through private-order institu-
tions reflects something deep and supremely important about Brit-
ish institutions in the eighteenth century. The culture of respecta-
bility and gentility helped solve the standard collective action
problems that bedevil the production of public goods. The emer-
gence of a plethora of networks, clubs, friendly societies, acade-
mies, and associations created a civil society, in which the private
provision of public goods became a reality and created what might
be called a civil economy.
JOEL MOKYR, THE ENLIGHTENED ECONOMY 381 (2009); see also Mark Koyama,
Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of
Public Goods? 32 (Ctr. for Historical Econ. and Related Research at York,
CHERRY Discussion Paper Series) (“[P]rivate prosecution associations not
only drew upon, but, in their turn, cultivated, a form of social capital that
made the private provision of some forms of public goods feasible.”).
56. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities
from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 43 (1998); Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal
Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 434
(1995); Charles T. Clotfelter, Private Security and the Public Safety, 5 J. URB.
ECON. 388 (1978); David de Meza & J. R. Gould, The Social Efficiency of Private
Decisions to Enforce Property Rights, 100 J. POL. ECON. 561 (1992); Keith N.
Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON. 197
(1996); Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus
Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991).
57. See Hylton, supra note 56; see also Shavell, supra note 56 (discussing
theft prevention as a public good problem).
2016] MULTIPLICATION EFFECT OF LEGAL INSURANCE 19
hidden in one of many possible locations within a car. When a
car is reported stolen, the police can activate the transmitter
and can track the precise location and movement of the stolen
vehicle. If Lojack car systems are very widespread, stealing cars
becomes a riskier activity for car thieves. But since criminals
cannot ex ante distinguish whether a car has a Lojack system
(even if the owner were to put a sticker on the window to sig-
nal the presence of a Lojack system), installing Lojack only
trivially reduces the likelihood that your own car will be stolen
(although it does increase the chance that your car will be re-
trieved when stolen). Any decrease in the aggregate crime
rates due to Lojack is an externality from the perspective of
the individual Lojack purchaser. A study by Ayres and Levitt
estimates that individuals who install Lojack in their cars ob-
tain less than ten percent of the total social benefits of Lojack.
This causes Lojack to be undersupplied in markets.58 If there
are not enough individuals that purchase Lojack, society losses
its deterrence benefits. A similar reasoning applies to legal in-
surance. The relevant analogy is that the positive externality
emerges because potential criminals do not know ex ante
whether a car has Lojack since a potential criminal cannot rec-
ognize this feature ex ante.59 Since potential criminals do not
know ex ante which cars have Lojack, they will not be able to
select their victims. The same reasoning applies to potential
injurers and victims who are covered by legal insurance: since
insurance coverage is not ascertainable prior to negligent ac-
tion by a wrongdoer, a free riding problem might emerge.
58. Ayres & Levitt, supra note 56. Others have pointed out that a free-
rider problem could easily materialize, since would-be thieves will stay away
from cars without Lojack out of fear that these cars might have the device.
See ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS 478–81 (4th ed. 2008). But see JOHN R. LOTT, FREEDOMNOMICS:
WHY THE FREE MARKET WORKS AND OTHER HALF-BAKED THEORIES DON’T
(2007) (recognizing the potential for a free-rider problem but also expres-
sing skepticism about the real effects of Lojack on theft). Note that even if a
Lojack owner wanted to signal the presence of Lojack, it would be difficult to
do so in a credible manner.
59. It would be different if the crime-deterring technology could be de-
tected ex ante, through, for example, a visible alarm system.
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IV.
SUPPLY SIDE COMPLICATIONS
The relatively weak demand for legal insurance goes hand
in hand with supply side complications. Because of the multi-
plication effect of legal insurance on deterrence, as explained
in the previous Part, insurance companies share in the com-
bined benefits of increasing deterrence and reducing accident
costs on the basis of legal expense insurance and subrogation.
This second order collective action problem helps explain why
insurance companies rarely promote legal expense insurance.
This incentive issue in the supply of legal insurance is height-
ened further by several other challenges associated with insur-
ance markets: adverse selection, moral hazard, and the un-
deruse of subrogation.
A. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
As applied to most insurance settings, providers of legal
insurance are faced by the dual challenge of adverse selection
and moral hazard. Because insurance premiums are especially
valuable to customers that are likely to engage in litigation,
there is a risk that legal insurance policies will disproportion-
ally attract litigious subscribers. Because such customers create
more costs on average, insurance companies might need to
raise premiums over time, which, in turn, makes insurance
coverage worthwhile only to the most litigious individuals.60
Additionally, because insurance coverage reduces the costs of
litigation, policyholders’ reduced concern with litigation
might make them less careful in avoiding incidents or disputes
that lead to litigation.61 Although this issue of moral hazard is
recognized more generally with regard to accident insurance,
the problem is actually even more acute in the context of legal
insurance. Even an individual with the most comprehensive ac-
cident insurance policy will exercise some care since he or she
knows that certain accident losses (severe physical injuries,
etc.) cannot be fully undone by way of damage compensation.
60. George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492–93 (1970) (classic paper explain-
ing the adverse selection problem created by information asymmetry in
secondhand car markets).
61. Bengt Ho¨lmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON.
74, 74 (1979).
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The costs of litigation, by contrast, do not impose such
residual concern for a policyholder. Litigation costs can be
fully compensated by the insurance company. Due to these ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems, insurance compa-
nies might be less attracted to legal insurance instruments.
B. The Underuse of Subrogation
After an insurance company has compensated the ex-
penses of the client, it may seek reimbursement from the per-
son or entity legally responsible for the accident. Such subro-
gation rights are common in insurance relationships more
generally, arising either by contract or by public regulation.62
If insurance companies effectively use their right of subroga-
tion (or added legal insurance policies as a default to damage
insurance), negligent behavior becomes more costly since
tortfeasors (or their insurance companies) are more likely to
bear the full costs of their actions.
In practice, however, subrogation is underused in insur-
ance markets.63 Moreover, insurance companies seldom sell
damage insurance with legal insurance as a standard (compul-
sory) addition, unless they are forced to do so by law, as is the
case in Sweden.64
Upon first sight, insurance companies clearly stand to
benefit if they exercise their right of subrogation. What ex-
62. In most jurisdictions, the common law provides a subrogation right
to insurers under property, liability, and some casualty policies. Most health
and medical policies expressly include subrogation clauses. See JOHN F. DOB-
BYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 385, 389 (4th ed. 1996). On the econom-
ics of subrogation generally, see SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 255; Alan O.
Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2001); Thomas S.
Ulen, The View from Abroad: Tort Law and Liability Insurance in the United States,
in TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 207 (Gerhard Wagner ed., 2005).
63. Richard Carris and William Bartlett criticize insurers for not asserting
their subrogation interests to the fullest extent. See Richard Carris & William
Bartlett, Benchmarking Claims Performance, RISK MGMT., Dec. 1994, at 30, 34. A
recent survey finds a subrogation recovery ratio average (gross subrogation
dollars recovered divided by paid losses) of merely 8.41%. The survey was
commissioned by Praxis Consulting and conducted by the Ward Group. In
it, twenty chief financial officers completed surveys about the subrogation
policies at their companies. Focus on Subrogation Missing from Many Firms, Sur-
vey Finds, PROP. CASUALTY 360° (Dec. 9, 2009, 3:32 PM), http://
www.property-casualty.com/News/2009/12/Pages/Focus-On-Subrogation-
Missing-From-Many-Firms-Survey-Finds.aspx.
64. Regan, The Swedish Legal Services Policy Remix, supra note 19.
22 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:1
plains the lack of subrogation? The costs of using the legal
process to arrive at the correct division of liability costs be-
tween insurance companies may explain the lack of subroga-
tion witnessed in insurance markets. Indeed, the expense of
apportioning costs across insurance providers has prompted
several scholars to advocate the elimination of subrogation
rights in different contexts.65 In many countries, insurers have
taken measures to avoid an unnecessarily litigious atmosphere
within the industry.66 Subrogation rights are often exercised
on the basis of ex ante agreements (e.g., bulk recoupment,
knock for knock, etc.).67 While these agreements may econo-
mize on administrative costs, bulk arrangements reduce the in-
centives to take care because individual risk differentiation be-
comes impossible. A complementary explanation for the lim-
ited use of subrogation could be that current law restricts
insurance subrogation to the amount of benefits that the in-
surer has paid its subscribers.68 Since first-party insurance is
typically restricted to economic losses,69 the restrictions pre-
clude an insurer from acquiring control over a substantial por-
65. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1996); PAUL
C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 103–04 (1991); Richard A. Ep-
stein, Coordination of Workers’ Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage Awards,
13 FORUM 464 (1978).
66. Richard Lewis, Insurers’ Agreements Not to Enforce Strict Legal Rights: Bar-
gaining with Government and in the Shadow of the Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 275
(1985).
67. Bulk recoupment agreements involve a standard payment of an
agreed percentage of all reported claims at a certain amount, usually where
the individual amounts involved are relatively small. See WERNER PFENNIG-
STORF WITH DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND
COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 134–36
(Donald G. Gifford & William M. Richman eds., 1991). For the case of the
Netherlands, see Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, Social Security Versus Tort
Law as Instruments to Compensate Personal Injuries: A Dutch Law and Economics
Perspective, in THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW 222 (Ulrich
Magnus ed., 2003). In knock for knock arrangements, rights of subrogation
are waived. In the United Kingdom, these agreements are made between
individual motor insurers. See Lewis, supra note 66, at 280–81. In the United
States, insurance companies often make use of an ex post lay arbitration
service.
68. TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 331–32 (2d ed. 2008).
69. W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering: Damages in Search of a Sounder Ratio-
nale, 1 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 141 (1996).
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tion of personal injury claims (non-pecuniary and punitive
damages).70
Whether the substantial costs of litigation are an accept-
able reason to favor the elimination of subrogation or to ap-
plaud incentive-dulling agreements between insurers depends
on the deterrence benefit of subrogation. From a theoretical
viewpoint, many scholars support subrogation because of its
positive effect on deterrence.71 Without subrogation at least
part of the damage will not be shifted to the injurer, which
reduces his or her incentive to prevent the loss.
Subrogation is usually exercised on the liability insurer,
who would optimally differentiate risks and would thus incor-
porate this increased risk (as a result of subrogation) in the
policy conditions of the insured injurer.72 Of course, a deter-
rence effect will be doubtful if the exercise of subrogation has
no or very little effect on liability insurance premiums. As has
been noted by Viscusi, it may be difficult to justify the abolition
of subrogation actions in the absence of any empirical support
indicating that the loss in controlling risks will be minor.73 Re-
cent empirical studies confirm the deterrent effect of tort law
accountability.74 Klick and Strattman find that collateral
70. For example, two thirds of medical malpractice awards in Illinois are
non-pecuniary. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE TORT SYS-
TEM IN ILLINOIS 66 (2005). In an interesting article, Kenneth Reinker and
David Rosenberg and have proposed to change the law of insurance subro-
gation for medical malpractice liability to allow insurers to acquire their in-
sureds’ potential malpractice claims without limitation. They argue that this
will improve both deterrence and insurance results of medical malpractice
liability. Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation: Im-
proving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J.
LEGAL STUD. 261 (2007).
71. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 12; Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and
the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517
(1984); Reinker & Rosenberg, supra note 70.
72. Theoretically, this could mean that the exercise of subrogation
against a liability insurer would amount to an increase in premiums or the
imposition of other policy conditions to prevent accidents. See Faure & Har-
tlief, supra note 67.
73. W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 147, 148 (1991).
74. Under the collateral source rule, the victim of an accident who has
received insurance or similar benefits collects full damages from a liable in-
jurer. No reduction is made due to the benefits that have partially or totally
eliminated the accident loss. Since the mid-seventies there has been a trend
against the collateral source rule; many states introduced a regime of collat-
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source reform leads to higher infant mortality rates.75 Rubin
and Shepherd find that the introduction of various forms of
set-off regimes had a statistically significant effect on the num-
ber of non-motor vehicle accidental deaths.76 Overall, it is not
unreasonable to expect some positive, deterrent effect from
subrogation.
Even though the deterrence effects of subrogation might
be substantial, insurance companies may not necessarily adopt
an aggressive subrogation strategy, however. If an insurance
company has a market share of, say, ten percent, then ninety
percent of the deterrence benefits would go to other insur-
ance companies (whose premiums do not reflect the costs of
subrogation suits). This could lead to a free rider problem that
prevents the insurance industry from taking meaningful ac-
tion. Consider the following example. Suppose that if one of
ten existing (e.g., casualty) insurance companies active in a
certain region adopts an aggressive subrogation strategy, in-
cluding the pursuit of many negative expected value suits, the
accident rate declines five percent. Consequently, all ten insur-
ance companies could lower their premiums by, for example,
$50 (from $250 to $200). Note that this is not an attractive
proposition to insurance companies. Doing so would force the
insurance company to raise its premium beyond $200. Due to
this effort to finance the litigation costs of subrogation, the
insurer would suffer a competitive disadvantage.
A similar argument has been made with respect to Lojack
prevention technology. Academic commentary offers two op-
posing perspectives on the question of why most auto insur-
ance companies fail to provide discounts on Lojack devices.77
According to one viewpoint, Lojack is not advantageous to in-
surers with a modest market share, since most of the benefit
eral benefits offset. In this regime, the amount of insurance or like benefits
is deducted from the damage payment the injurer is liable for. See Fernando
Gomez & Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Systems and Imperfect
Liability Rules, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE O¨KONOMISCHE
ANALYSE [Internationalization of the Law and its Economic Analysis] 217–37
(Jochen Bigus et al. eds., 2008).
75. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Medical Malpractice Reform and
Physicians in High-Risk Specialties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 134 (2007).
76. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007).
77. In some states discounts are mandated.
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will go to their rivals.78 According to another view, Lojack is
probably not very effective. If it were, the free rider problem
could be easily solved. For instance, if car manufacturers like
Porsche would install Lojack standard on all their cars, thieves
would stay away from these cars, and these car manufacturers
would reap the benefits.79 Note however that, even if this argu-
ment is correct, it would be hard to find an analogous market
solution in the context of legal insurance and tort accident
prevention. Overall, these observations suggest that the public
good problem of legal insurance markets might be quite per-
vasive. In Part V, we discuss potential policy options and mar-
ket interventions.
V.
POLICY OPTIONS
Whenever litigation costs prevent victims from pursuing
valid legal tort claims, the deterrent effect of the tort system is
undermined. In this regard, contingency fee arrangements,80
legal aid, and legal insurance all serve the valuable purpose of
facilitating legal claims when individual plaintiffs lack the fi-
nancial means to pursue a dispute in court. Given the multipli-
cation effect identified in this Article, legal insurance has a
unique potential to increase overall accountability and deter-
rence. In this light, the under-provision of legal insurance poli-
cies is a cause of grave concern. In this Part, we discuss a num-
ber of policy options that might bolster the adaptation of legal
insurance policies.
A. Status Quo
Before taking a closer look at the possible solutions for
the curious scarcity of active legal insurance policies, it is wise
78. Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Stop, Thief!, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2005), http:/
/www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0110/088_print.html.
79. When the rate of theft of a particular car model decreases, that
model becomes more attractive to consumers because insurance premiums
will be lower. See LOTT, supra note 58, at 43–44.
80. See, e.g., RICHARD MOORHEAD & PETER HURST, “IMPROVING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE:” CONTINGENCY FEES: A STUDY OF THEIR OPERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL 9–10 (Robert Musgrove ed.,
2008) (concluding from a review of the literature that contingency fees may
broaden access to justice for multi-party and higher value cases, but also that
they may narrow access to justice for lower value cases).
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to consider whether or how markets might evolve in the ab-
sence of regulatory intervention.81 Sometimes, insurance in-
dustries adjust their practices in reaction to external events.
For instance, while disaster insurers did not promote loss con-
trol measures for many years, the severe losses caused by Hur-
ricane Andrew urged the insurance industry to take a new per-
spective on mitigation measures.82 Likewise, external events
may eventually stimulate (first-party) insurers to promote legal
expenses insurance more aggressively, since the added deter-
rence will likely reduce accidents and payouts to insured vic-
tims. Note, however, that huge exogenous shocks are not likely
with regard to most accidents. An important difference be-
tween the damage caused by natural disasters and human ac-
tions in accidents relates to the predictability, frequency, and
extent of damage caused by the former. The unpredictable na-
ture of disasters can leave insurers with immense losses and
take away their opportunity to invest income from premiums.
Especially when disasters occur in periods when capital mar-
kets provide high returns on investments, the profit margins of
insurance companies will decrease substantially. By contrast,
the frequency and extent of damage caused by humans (e.g.,
traffic accidents) is much more predictable. Over the years,
these damages may increase, but they often follow quite stable
and logical evolutions, giving insurers the possibility to take
them into account well in advance.
81. Any Regulatory Impact Analysis Checklist starts with the advantages
and disadvantages of deciding to take no action. See, e.g., OECD, REGULA-
TORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: BEST PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES, 146, 158, 225
(1997), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/35258828.pdf; see also
OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRI-
MER 4 (2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg
/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf (ordering
agencies to “define the baseline” and stating that “the baseline represents
the agency’s best assessment of what the world would be like absent the ac-
tion. To specify the baseline, the agency may need to consider a wide range
of factors and should incorporate the agency’s best forecast of how the world
will change in the future, with particular attention to factors that affect the
expected benefits and costs of the rule. For example, population growth,
economic growth, and the evolution of the relevant markets should all be
taken into account.”).
82. Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, 12 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171 (1996).
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Still, even if exogenous circumstances could fundamen-
tally alter incentives for the supply of insurance policies, legal
insurance coverage will not be widespread unless the demand
for policies increases as well. Of course, if the attitudinal
change on the supply side causes insurers, for example, to au-
tomatically add legal insurance to other insurance policies,
any demand side intervention would be unnecessary. But short
of that, for instance, if insurers merely put more effort into
convincing potential clients to take legal insurance, too many
individuals may still decide to remain uninsured. In that case,
other policy measures may still be necessary.
B. Distinguishing Between Different Sources of Market Failure
This Article has highlighted that the market for legal in-
surance is plagued by several sources of market failure. We
have discussed various challenges on the demand side as well
as the supply side.83
Consequently, before deciding how to intervene, regula-
tors need to identify what source(s) of market failure(s) is
(are) most influential. If the lack of legal insurance coverage is
mainly due to individuals’ underestimation of the probability
that they will be involved in an accident or the chances that
they might need to file a claim in court,84 the most straightfor-
ward regulatory approach is to enhance the available informa-
tion and to correct widespread misperceptions about the costs
and risk of litigation. A strand of literature in behavioral sci-
ence has recently focused on information regulation in a wide
range of legal issues, especially involving consumer protection,
to correct behavioral anomalies and irrational attitudes to-
wards risk.85 Empirical evidence suggests however that these
behavioral attitudes are quite pervasive and difficult to cor-
rect.86
83. See supra Parts II & IV.
84. See supra Part II. Also, see generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRA-
TIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008).
85. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375
(2004); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECI-
SIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
86. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998); Rus-
sell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
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Before taking action, regulators might want to assess to
what extent the demand and supply of legal insurance is
caused by the collective action problem identified in this Arti-
cle. One possible test for the incidence of collective action
problems is to examine whether legal insurance coverage is
more extended for instances where the injurer can distinguish
between victims with and without legal insurance. This might
confirm the presence of collective action issues since the other
available explanations (e.g., lack of information) do not distin-
guish between instances where deterrence benefits are shared
or where they are fully captured by the individual policy-
holder. Empirical data from the United Kingdom provide
some affirmation that collective action problems help explain
the under-provision of legal insurance. Although stand-alone
legal insurance policies are not very common in England,87 a
lot of commercial insurance policies are sold on a stand-alone
basis.88 Such policies are the third major component of the
English legal insurance market and account for a third of
gross premiums. The policies cover typical commercial areas
such as contract disputes, data protection, tax, employment,
etc. Note that in commercial relationships, insured companies
are able to inform their contractual counterparties (prior to
disputes) that they have legal expense insurance. Moreover,
commercial relationships are often long-term. Once a (poten-
tial) dispute arises, it may become known that the victim has
legal insurance, and this information will have its effect on the
future relations between the parties (and potentially between
the victim and other potential injurers when some information
flows to them). To summarize, more extensive research might
be in order to compare the public good effect of legal insur-
ance markets with other potential factors that reduce the de-
mand for legal expense insurance policies.
C. Regulatory Approaches
More direct corrective action might be necessary in order
to correct the public good market failure of legal insurance.
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1059
(2000).
87. Stand-alone policies are individual insurance policies that have no
other policies included.
88. See Kilian, supra note 6, at 34.
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Various options are available to regulators.89 First, legislators
might consider making legal insurance compulsory or mandat-
ing that legal insurance be added to other widespread insur-
ance policies. This approach would solve the collective action
issues highlighted above.90 Also, the pooling of risk on such a
large scale would make legal insurance more cost-effective to
insurance companies. The effect on insurance policyholders
would be more ambiguous. On the one hand, all policyholders
would stand to benefit since every subscriber would share in
(and contribute to) the increased overall deterrence and the
reduction of accident costs. On the other hand, it is important
to recognize that this approach takes away the individual au-
tonomy of potential policyholders who might have informa-
tion or resources that render legal insurance less valuable to
them.91
Second, regulators might address the lack of subrogation
among insurance companies. Avoiding subrogation may assist
insurance companies in mitigating administrative costs. Yet, as
discussed previously, this attitude also reduces overall account-
ability and amplifies some of the collective action problems
highlighted in this Article. Part of the challenge of mandating
subrogation would of course be in the details, especially as it
relates to how to structure mandatory subrogation effectively
without imposing too high an administrative burden on insur-
ance companies. Of course, if mandatory subrogation causes
premiums to go up too, the policy is likely to be counter-
productive.92 Third, policymakers could rely on financial in-
centives by rewarding individuals who take legal insurance
and/or punishing individuals who do not.93 For example, a
tax benefit could be provided to individuals who subscribe to
legal insurance.94 Alternatively, court fees might be raised for
89. See generally, Seth J. Chandler, Insurance Regulation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW & ECONOMICS 837 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000).
90. See supra Section III.B.
91. See Michael G. Faure, Economic Criteria for Compulsory Insurance, 31 THE
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 149 (2006).
92. See supra Section IV.B.
93. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 9 (discussing the relative
benefits of applying carrots or sticks).
94. A few European countries, including Belgium, have enacted tax
breaks for legal insurance. See MICHAEL FAURE ET AL., RESULTAATGERE-
LATEERDE BELONINGSSYSTEMEN VOOR ADVOCATEN: EEN VERGELIJKENDE
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plaintiffs who do not have legal insurance. Finally, if none of
these regulatory approaches prove viable, another option
would be to expand the available system of legal aid to cases
that hold the promise of generating substantial deterrence.95
Since the essence of the problem concerns litigation costs, le-
gal aid assistance can be useful in raising overall accountability
while also sustaining the multiplication benefits associated
with legal insurance.96 Of course such approach would en-
counter the familiar costs involved with subsidized litigation
and one would have to be mindful of the problems encoun-
tered today with legal aid policies.97
CONCLUSION
This Article provides new insights into the various causes
and costs of the modest demand and supply of active legal in-
surance policies. First, we pointed out an overlooked multipli-
cation benefit of legal insurance in the field of tort law. Be-
cause legal insurance coverage is non-observable to tort of-
fenders ex ante, such policies affect the average likelihood that
a negligent offender will be held accountable. As a result, even
if not everyone is insured to bring legal claims, legal insurance
increases the overall expected costs of engaging in negligent,
BESCHRIJVING VAN BELONINGSSYSTEMEN VOOR ADVOCATEN IN EEN AANTAL LAN-
DEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE EN HONG KONG [Showing Related Lawyers’ Fees:
A Comparative Description of Lawyers’ Fees in Some Countries in the Euro-
pean Union and Hong Kong] 41 (2006).
95. Gary Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
337, 344–45 (1980); Tom C. Clark, Changing Times, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6
(1973) (urging the bar to consider a “prepaid legal insurance similar to hos-
pital and health insurance in the medical field”) cited in Nora V. Demleitner,
The Challenges to Legal Education in 1973 and 2012: An Introduction to the Anni-
versary Edition of the Hofstra Law Review, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 648 (2012).
96. Depending on the criteria that would be imposed to receive legal
insurance, it is reasonable to assume that potential offenders or tortfeasors
would often not be able to distinguish between victims that are eligible to
receive legal aid and those that are not.
97. See, e.g., FRANCISCO CABRILLO & SEAN FITZPATRICK, THE ECONOMICS OF
COURTS AND LITIGATION 138–44 (2008); John Flood & Avis Whyte, What’s
Wrong with Legal Aid? Lessons from Outside the UK, 25 CIV. JUST. Q. 80 (2006)
(arguing that legal aid has to be viewed in tandem with the provision of
welfare services); Charles S. Potts, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Legal Aid
or Public Defender, 28 TEX. L. REV. 491 (1950). See also, on the efficacy of
public defenders, LISA J. MCINTYRE, PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW
IN THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE (1987).
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harmful behavior. Second, we showed that the potential of le-
gal insurance remains unexploited due to a host of collective
action issues among policyholders and the mixed incentives
within insurance industries. Individual policyholders do not
capture the full deterrence benefits of their individual sub-
scriptions, while insurance companies may have incentives to
promote other insurance instruments. Third, the potential
policy options discussed in this Article, ranging from promot-
ing policies to more coercive approaches such as mandatory
subrogation and compulsory insurance, could help address
these issues and bolster the deterrent effect of the tort system.
